The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

November 2017

Third Generation Discrimination: The Ripple
Effects of Gender Bias in the Workplace
Catherine Ross Dunham

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dunham, Catherine Ross (2017) "Third Generation Discrimination: The Ripple Effects of Gender Bias in the
Workplace," Akron Law Review: Vol. 51 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Dunham: Third Generation Discrimination

THIRD GENERATION DISCRIMINATION: THE RIPPLE
EFFECTS OF GENDER BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE
Catherine Ross Dunham*

I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

Introduction ................................................................. 55
Considering the Role of Implicit Bias in the Factual
Context of Gender-Based Workplace Discrimination
Suits ............................................................................. 59
A. Bias and Discrimination Generally ....................... 59
B. Pao v. Kleiner ....................................................... 62
C. Wal-Mart v. Dukes ................................................ 67
Implicit Gender Bias and Second Generation
Discrimination ............................................................. 72
A. First Generation Discrimination ........................... 73
B. Second Generation Discrimination ....................... 76
Considering the role of the Court system—Third
Generation Discrimination .......................................... 85
A. Implicit Bias and the Jury ..................................... 86
B. Implicit Bias and the Judiciary ............................. 90
C. Third Generation Discrimination .......................... 95
Conclusion ................................................................... 98
I. INTRODUCTION

What is implicit bias? What does it look like? How can we define
and address it in personal and legal contexts, working towards the end
goal of making the workplace more amenable to successful career paths
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for all engaged? These questions constitute the modern taxonomy of
questions in the area of gender 1 discrimination. Thanks to plaintiffs of the
past 50 years and their arduous battles under Title VII with quid pro quo
sexual harassment, hostile environment sexual harassment, pregnancy
discrimination, gender discrimination in benefits and work assignments,
and many other indignities, we have passed through the era of blatant, unactionable gender-based discrimination. Of course, certain work
environments continue to pose threats to female workers.2 In those
environments, employers and supervisors prey on women who are illpositioned to access legal and other support services, and thus continue to
operate workplace environments that openly discriminate based on gender
and openly threaten female employees. But the risks to female workers
are not only present in those extreme environments. Women in safe
corporate jobs and professional jobs, those white-collar bastions of Mad
Men 3 fame, battle an evolved species of gender discrimination, which
flows from implicit bias against women. Generally, and specifically, this
happens to women attempting to compete in male-driven industries and
professions.
Betty Dukes 4 was a Wal-Mart employee who could not get promoted
into an entry-level management position despite her employer’s
sophisticated employment policies, which included the legally
appropriate policies designed to protect women at Wal-Mart from genderbased discrimination. 5 At Wal-Mart, the decision to elevate employees
into entry-level management positions was delegated to department and
store managers. Those managers, who were predominantly male at the
time of Betty Dukes’ employment, used their discretion in determining
1. The term gender as used in this Article is intended to refer to all people identifying as
female and is not intended to limit the discussion of gender-based discrimination to persons who
possess a female reproductive system and secondary sex characteristics.
2. This Article is focused on implicit biases based on gender and cases alleging claims based
on implicit bias. However, this focus is in no way intended to diminish the fact that many women
continue to work in oppressive environments where they face overt gender discrimination and sexual
harassment. For example, for many agricultural workers, threats of rape and physical violence
continue. See GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES AND FIFTY YEARS THAT
CHANGED AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 240 (St. Martin’s Press 2016).
3. Mad Men (AMC 2007-2015).
4. During the drafting of this Article, Betty Dukes passed away at age 67. She began working
at Wal-Mart in 1994 and remained in her job throughout her lawsuit against Wal-Mart, retiring in
2016. Michael Corkery, Betty Dukes, Greeter Whose Walmart Lawsuit Went to Supreme Court, Dies
at 67, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/business/betty-dukes-deadwalmart-worker-led-landmark-class-action-sex-biascase.html?emc=edit_ca_20170719&nl=california-today&nlid=18427111&te=1
[http://perma.cc/8TJ5-EQVA].
5. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344, 353 (2011).
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which employees should be elevated to the more lucrative manager
positions. Despite a strong work record, Betty Dukes was overlooked time
and time again. She ultimately filed suit against Wal-Mart under Title VII
for gender-based discrimination, arguing that it was the discretion vested
in the junior managers that caused the gender-based discrimination. Male
managers tended to promote male employees onto the management track,
defaulting at times to stereotypes about female managers and perceptions
of which employees needed the better positions to advance in the
company or to support families at home. The culture at Wal-Mart allowed
stereotypes about women’s ability to function as managers to block
gateway promotions of female retail workers to managers. In this way, the
covert message mimicked an overt message that women were less
amenable to work and should not take jobs away from men. Betty Dukes
argued that the male managers, who had the power to promote, used
implicit bias against women that constituted Title VII gender-based
discrimination. 6
Ellen Pao worked in a very different professional context. 7 Ellen Pao
was an Ivy League educated management analyst and lawyer who had
enjoyed success in the field of banking and finance. She was praised for
her intellect and talents and rose in her profession to a position within the
Silicon Valley venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,
LLC (Kleiner). She joined the firm as a junior partner performing various
functions within the firm, including managing projects and new
initiatives, identifying potential investments, and supporting the firm’s
managing partner, John Doerr. Her goal was to be promoted to a full
partner at the firm, which specialized in venture capital financing for
Silicon Valley start-up tech companies.
In this environment, she was a woman among men at every turn,
dealing both with the male-dominated atmosphere of banking and finance
as well as the male-dominated atmosphere of Silicon Valley tech. By her
own assessment, she struggled at times to find her footing in this mixed
environment. She also felt pressure to form good working relationships
with her male colleagues and to please her male superiors. The firm’s
culture 8 required close contact with colleagues, and Pao ultimately
became romantically involved with Ajit Nazre, a same-level colleague,
after rebuffing his advances and reporting Nazre’s behavior to superiors
in the firm. After complaining of harassment by Nazre and other partners,
6. Id. at 345.
7. Complaint for Damages at ¶¶ 2-3, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, LLC, (Cal.
Super. May 10, 2012) (No. CGC-12-520719) [hereinafter Pao Complaint].
8. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
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Pao continued her work at Kleiner, working towards her goal of
partnership.
However, she was never considered for partner because she was
excluded from opportunities, meetings, and events, which were essential
to advancement in the firm. The firm relied on her personnel reviews in
evaluating her for partnership. These reviews included evaluative
comments that ran the gamut from her having sharp elbows and
complaining too much, or being too quiet. 9 Pao was forced to walk the
impossible tightrope between femininity and perceptions of job-related
masculine superiority. When she was brusque with colleagues and junior
employees, she was criticized for mannerisms routinely employed by men
in both the finance and tech industries. When she did not assert herself,
she was labeled as weak. When she complained about harassment, she
was criticized for making trouble. This storm of critique led her to leave
Kleiner and file a claim for Title VII gender-based discrimination
premised on the theory that her employer—despite written policies and
procedures which protected against discrimination—used stereotypes,
and that the male managers’ implicit biases against women colleagues
positioned Pao for her eventual failure. 10
Betty Dukes and Ellen Pao may appear to have little in common, but
they are both pioneers in developing a conversation about the role of
implicit bias against women in the workplace. This Article will discuss
their cases in greater detail to focus on a larger question regarding genderbased discrimination and implicit bias. Courts and scholars have
recognized the existence of structural or second generation
discrimination, which describes aspects of an organization’s structure that
facilitate or enable implicit gender bias. 11 Betty Dukes’ case was an
unsuccessful attempt to litigate a claim for second generation
discrimination under Title VII, ultimately failing at the United States
Supreme Court. Ellen Pao was also unsuccessful in her effort to persuade
a San Francisco jury that she was a victim of second generation
discrimination. In both cases, men and women of various backgrounds
determined the ultimate fate of the claims. This Article asks if Title VII
claims based on second generation discrimination are further inhibited by
the implicit biases of judges and juries. How can a female plaintiff
convince a fact-finder or a reviewing judge that she has been
9. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 9-11.
10. Id.
11. See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (discussing aspects of an organization’s structure that
allow or encourage implicit bias); see also infra notes 133-166 and accompanying text.
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discriminated against through stereotypes and bias if those hearing the
case share the same implicit gender bias?
This Article will begin by examining the Pao and Dukes cases,
focusing on the role of the decision-makers in the ultimate outcomes of
those cases. The Article will then consider implicit bias as a concept,
noting the interplay between implicit bias and gender-based stereotypes.
Building on that understanding, the Article will explore generally the
evolution of second generation discrimination as a legal theory,
connecting that analysis back to Dukes’ and Pao’s cases. The Article will
then explore the role of implicit bias in the court system, reviewing social
science literature regarding the role of gender-based bias in the courtroom
as it relates to female attorneys, female litigants, and the effect of certain
“feminine traits” in the courtroom. The Article will argue that genderbased implicit bias against female litigants plays out in the form of a Third
Generation Discrimination, a term developed here, by layering on the
biases of judges and juries. Third Generation Discrimination further
undermines efforts by women seeking relief under Title VII for workplace
discrimination based on claims that their employer allowed bias against
them to curb their opportunities for advancement. Women will only
succeed in implicit bias cases, such as those brought by Dukes and Pao, if
the facts of the case are evaluated by those who can assess the case without
regard to their own preconceptions about the role of women in the
workplace and in society.
II. CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE FACTUAL
CONTEXT OF GENDER-BASED WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION SUITS
As an entry point for the conversation about bias-based
discrimination, this section examines and compares two cases filed as
Title VII claims under a theory of second generation discrimination. The
relevant background for the case analyses is an overview of the general
theory of bias-based gender discrimination, which flows from social
science literature.
A.

Bias and Discrimination Generally

Bias is a preconceived opinion or a predisposition to decide a cause
or issue in a certain way. 12 Bias flows from stereotypes, which are based
12. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012).
The concepts of bias, explicit and implicit, and the related concept of confirmation bias have been
studied extensively in social science literature. Any attempt to encapsulate that literature in this Article
would be inept. As such, this Article offers basic definitions and references to other writings, which
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on interactions with others in the regular course of society. 13 Implicit
biases are attitudes not consciously accessible, which flow from
stereotypes. 14 Implicit biases are often not understood by the holder or
accepted as existing in relevant settings. 15
Bias flows from stereotype, and stereotype thinking begins early in
life, found in children as young as three years old. 16 Research shows that
young people use exposure to stereotypes to interpret the world around
them, relying on messages from families, communities, and media to
confirm or challenge the stereotype thinking. 17 As individuals grow, the
stereotypes harden. 18 Even though a person may develop “non-biased
views of the world,” stereotype thinking tends to become automatic,
leading to implicit biases.19 Once a person reaches adulthood their implicit
biases have been absorbed into their unconscious thinking process, and
they rely on the stereotypes giving rise to those biases to frame their
understanding of the world around them. 20
This evolution of implicit bias, specifically gender-based implicit
bias, is a central tenet of gender discrimination in the workplace. Genderbased implicit bias flows from uncorrected stereotype thinking about the
differences between men and women. 21 Workplace discrimination, based

explore the issues with greater depth and scope.
13. Id. “A stereotype is an association between a concept . . . and a trait.” Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1132. “[E]xplicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are consciously accessible
through introspection and endorsed as appropriate. If no social norm against these biases exists within
a given context, a person will freely broadcast them to others. But if such a norm exists, then explicit
biases can be concealed to manage the impressions that others have of us. By contrast, implicit biases
are attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible through introspection. If we find out
we have them, we may indeed reject them as inappropriate.” Id.
16. Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An
Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2010) (citing Antony Page, Batson’s BlindSpot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 203–04 (2005)).
17. See Page, supra note 16.
18. See Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 6.
19. Id. Levinson and Young use this example related to gender bias: “In the context of gender
stereotypes, children are likely to learn at an early age that men are ‘competent, rational, assertive,
independent, objective, and self-confident,’ and women are ‘emotional, submissive, dependent,
tactful, and gentle.’” Id. (quoting Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping:
Historical and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 604
(1997)).
20. Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 6; see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of
Sexism, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 613, 618 (2007) (discussing the role of stereotypes and
perceptions in the workplace).
21. See generally Charles Elliot, Juries, Sex and Emotional Affect, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
37, 38 (2011) (evaluating the impact of sex stereotypes on the legal process).
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on implicit bias, has been pursued under a theory of second generation
discrimination. 22
To clarify, early gender-based workplace discrimination cases are
described here as first generation discrimination cases. First generation
discrimination was grounded in the explicit biases of male employers,
supervisors, and co-workers against female colleagues. 23 In early gender
discrimination cases, male supervisors were alleged to have discriminated
against women in overt ways, either through discriminatory policies or
through discreet actions designed to intimidate and harass female
workers. 24 Although the history of legal action for gender-based
workplace discrimination began to take shape in the 1970s, the workplace
practices long pre-dated the early cases.25 Discriminatory practices
existed because there was no professional or social cost to a man who
discriminated against a woman in the workplace. If a male worker asserted
a female worker was not suited to higher-level or higher paying work
because of her sex, there was no pushback from either the male worker’s
supervisor, his colleagues, or even the female workers. His attitude, which
flowed from the generally accepted stereotypes of men and women, was
determined valid and did not raise issues of fairness in the minds and
practices of employers. This was true in most workplace contexts, even
those where physical size, strength, or level of education were not
essential to the work assigned.
The workplace was simply a mirror of the greater social context
wherein men worked and women acted as either caretakers or employees
in traditionally female occupations, such as nursing, teaching, or clerical
support. 26 Since the attitudes within the workplace followed the overall
social norms of the time, no punishment—legal, social, or personal—was
levied for constructing a workplace environment that excluded or
inhibited female employees. For that matter, the actions and attitudes now
determined to be discriminatory were not even seen as such prior to the
evolution of gender-based workplace discrimination law. 27

22. Sturm, supra note 11, at 460; see infra pp. 76-85 regarding the theory of second generation
discrimination.
23. Sturm, supra note 11, at 465-66.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 466-67.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 2, at 3.
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Pao v. Kleiner

Ellen Pao was not a slacker. She earned an electrical engineering
degree from Princeton University, a law degree from Harvard Law
School, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. She had worked in
“Big Law” before entering business and beginning her business career
working in technology firms. 28 In 2005, she joined Kleiner, a Silicon
Valley venture capital firm that raises funds from wealthy institutional
and individual investors and invests those funds in technology
companies. 29
Kleiner’s structure included junior, senior, and managing partners. 30
Pao joined Kleiner as a junior partner with every intention of advancing
to the highest levels and was told she would move into a full-time
investing position after three years. 31 She also had the opportunity to work
with John Doerr, a managing partner, in which she initially wrote his
speeches and articles, and ultimately, served as his chief-of-staff. 32 In
early 2006, Pao traveled on business with another junior partner, Ajit
Nazre. 33 After the trip, Pao complained that Nazre made unwanted sexual
advances toward her and became “brusque and distant” when she rebuffed
his advances. 34 According to Pao, she spent the following year managing
Nazre’s advances. 35 When she refused him, he became an obstructionist
and excluded her from important business interactions. 36 She ultimately
consented to his advances, then ended their relationship in October
2006. 37 Pao contends that after she ended the relationship, Nazre retaliated
in the form of further exclusion from access to important business
matters. 38 Pao complained to Kleiner management and the human
resources department, but received no relief. 39 According to Pao,
members of the firm told her this retaliation was unfair, but that she should
probably just accept it and even consider continuing her relationship with

28. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 5.
29. Id. ¶ 7.
30. Id. ¶ 6.
31. Id. ¶ 7.
32. Id.
33. Id. ¶ 8.
34. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
35. Id. ¶ 8.
36. Id. ¶ 9; Trial Brief of Plaintiff Ellen Pao at 2, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,
LLC, (Cal. Super. Feb. 17, 2015) (No. CGC-12-520719) [hereinafter Pao Trial Brief].
37. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 8.
38. Id. ¶ 9.
39. Id.
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Nazre to better her career advancement. 40 Pao also reported unwanted
romantic advances from another Kleiner partner and again received no
responses from Kleiner management. 41 Nazre was promoted to senior
partner in December 2007 and put in a position of supervision over Pao. 42
When Pao complained about Nazre’s supervision of her, in light of their
earlier relationship and in light of his new office location across the hall
from Pao, Pao was asked to relocate her office, which she refused on the
basis of it being retaliation. She was then offered relocation to the China
office, which she also refused. 43
Three years after her arrival at Kleiner, Pao was not given a
performance review, and thus, could not be evaluated for a next-level
partnership position. 44 By this time, she was labeled as a complainer and
was not able to make her case for promotion or rebut her detractors
because of management’s refusal to review her. She continued to be
excluded from business matters, including exclusion from essential
activities during an important New York board-level meeting in October
2011. 45 In December 2011, Pao learned that another female employee had
complained about Nazre’s sexual harassment.46 That complaint led to an
internal investigation. Following the internal investigation, Nazre left
Kleiner 47 and Pao filed suit in San Francisco Superior Court for gender
discrimination under California law. 48
Pao’s gender discrimination claims were grounded in California’s
Fair Employment and Housing Act, which allows claims for gender-based
discrimination and retaliation, which are substantially similar to Title VII
claims. 49 Under federal law, Pao’s claims would be considered disparate
impact workplace discrimination claims. She was not alleging quid pro
quo sexual harassment, but rather that the conditions in her workplace,
caused by the overall culture of Kleiner, as well as sexual harassment and
gender-based discrimination by Nazre, were hostile to her advancement,
and ultimately to her ability to continue to work at Kleiner. Pao alleged
40. Id.
41. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.
42. Id. ¶ 15.
43. Id. ¶ 16.
44. Id. ¶ 19.
45. Id. ¶ 32.
46. Id. ¶ 31.
47. Id. ¶ 31, 47; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
48. Pao Complaint, supra note 7.
49. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act, WEST’S ANN. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§
12900–906 (West through 2017 Sess. Ch. 859). Pao’s state law claims were substantially the same as
Betty Dukes’s claim for Title VII gender discrimination—both women alleged they were victims of
second generation discrimination.
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that Kleiner had an overall culture that favored male employees,
demonstrated by the firm’s acceptance of Nazre’s sexual advances and
failure to respond to Pao’s complaints about the actions of Nazre and
others. 50 Furthermore, Pao argued that her performance evaluations were
heavily focused on Kleiner’s partner assessments of her interpersonal
skills, commenting she was “territorial,” while also criticizing her for
acting entitled and complaining too much. 51 Some evaluations urged her
to be less aggressive, some urged her to be less passive and not wait for
orders from others, and others labeled her entitled and not trustworthy. 52
In further support of her second generation discrimination claim, Pao
argued Kleiner had a practice of advancing male candidates over female
candidates. 53 Kleiner had not had a female partner since its inception in
the 1970s until 2005, the year of Pao’s hire. 54 In 2009, Pao was among six
junior partners eligible for promotion to senior partner status at Kleiner.55
In 2011, three male junior partners were promoted to senior partner over
four eligible female junior partners, including Pao, despite the fact that
the women had more experience and longer tenures than any of the male
candidates. 56 According to Kleiner management, the promotion decisions
followed an analysis of the candidate’s successful business outcomes for
the firm. 57 However, none of the three promoted male partners had
successful business outcomes for Kleiner prior to promotion. 58 In contrast,
Pao had been instrumental in Kleiner’s investment in RPX Corporation,
leading to a successful initial public offering in 2011. 59 Kleiner did not
promote a woman into a senior partner role until 2012, which was after
Pao filed her lawsuit. 60
At base, the Kleiner workplace had similar attributes to the Wal-Mart
workplace: the supervisors were male and the culture fostered the
advancement of male candidates by allowing implicit biases against

50. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 37.
51. Trial Brief of Defendant Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, LLC at 6, Pao v. Kleiner
Perkins Caufield & Byers, LLC, (Cal. Super. Feb. 17, 2015) (No. CGC-12-520719) [hereinafter
Kleiner Trial Brief]; See Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 23, 27, 30.
52. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4-5 (explaining that Pao’s company claimed she was not
talkative enough in meetings and that she had issues with her colleagues for “much of her
employment”); see Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 23, 27, 30.
53. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 19.
58. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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female candidates to play a role in promotion and pay decisions. Kleiner
merged two male-dominated professional worlds—finance and tech. The
Silicon Valley tech industry has been widely criticized as being maledominated and, at times, hostile to female intrusion. 61 The tech industry’s
reluctance to hire and promote female professionals may flow from
general antipathy towards women in the STEM fields, which has led to
male-dominated contexts in higher education and professional
environments. 62 The Silicon Valley tech culture is heavily populated by
men who have not worked with women and lack an understanding of
female colleagues without reference to stereotypes.63 Banking and finance
has long been male-dominated, with a culture so testosterone-driven as to
be examined academically and immortalized in pop culture. 64 Banking
has evolved into a better environment for female employees, but the world
of venture capital financing is still male-dominated and focused on big
deals and major players. 65 This blending of professional cultures defined
the Kleiner culture, and Pao argued that these factors, among others,
interfered with her opportunities for success in the firm.
A San Francisco jury heard Pao’s case in 2015 and on March 27,
2015, a jury of six men and six women delivered a verdict in favor of

61. See Vauhini Vara, The Ellen Pao Trial: What Do We Mean by “Discrimination”?, THE
NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-ellen-pao-trialwhat-do-we-mean-by-discrimination [http://perma.cc/FPC9-4MXD] (“Deborah Rhode, a law
professor at Stanford, told me, ‘The sort of evidence you’re seeing in the Ellen Pao case is very typical
of what’s out there in Silicon Valley. There are no smoking guns; much of it is what social scientists
call micro-indignities—small incidents that viewed individually may seem trivial, but when viewed
cumulatively point to a practice of insensitivity and devaluation that can get in the way of work
performance.’”).
62. See Ernesto Reuben et al., How Stereotypes Impair Women’s Careers in Science, 111
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF U.S. 4403 (2013); see also Lawrence H. Summers,
President, Harvard Univ., Remarks at NBER Conference on Diversifying the Science & Engineering
Workplace,
p.
5
(Jan.
14,
2005)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.harvard.edu/president/speeches/summers_2005/nber.php [http://perma.cc/NYE7-F37R])
(explaining that Harvard President Larry Summers suggested that one reason there are relatively few
women in top positions in science may be “issues of intrinsic aptitude”).
63. Summers, supra note 62, at 2, 4, 6, 7; see also Pao’s Trial Brief, which notes that from its
inception in the 1970s until 2009, every managing partner was male, thus preventing the male Kleiner
partners from working with women colleagues on venture capital projects. Pao Trial Brief, supra note
36, at 3.
64. See THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Red Granite Pictures 2013). For an interesting discussion
of sexual harassment in the legal workplace, see Pamela J. White & Susan R. Matluck, Conduct
Unbecoming a Lawyer: Expanding Tort Remedies for Sexual Harassment, 24 Brief 16, 59 (1995); see
generally THOMAS, supra note 2.
65. Valentina Zarya, Venture Capital’s Gender Gap is Actually Getting Worse, FORTUNE
MAGAZINE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/13/female-founders-venture-capital/
[http://perma.cc/P2XH-GBUA].
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Kleiner on all of Pao’s claims. 66 On the issue of gender discrimination,
the jury voted 10–2 in favor of Kleiner with the vote counts split evenly
by gender. 67 On the question of whether Kleiner had retaliated against Pao
for complaining of sexual harassment by not promoting her to partner, the
jury again found in favor of Kleiner 10–2. 68 She was awarded no damages
by the jury on any aspect of her claim. 69
Workplace discrimination lawsuits are notoriously complex and
risky at trial. It is very hard to determine how a jury will react to the parties
in the case, who are invariably witnesses, and to information about the
culture in each workplace. In most Title VII claims, a jury will most likely
hold a defendant accountable when a female employee is forced into a
sexual relationship with a supervisor or required to work in an area with
posted pornography and sexually offensive content. Most juries will be
sympathetic to a woman who is denied a job, pay, benefits, or promotion
because of her gender, her pregnancy, or her caretaker responsibilities. In
the past 50 years, society has evolved to a point where acceptance of this
level of indignity is marginalized. However, people continue to use
stereotypes as a means to assess the parties in a lawsuit and the relevant
facts. 70 If a juror, male or female, follows the stereotype that successful
women are pushy and unpleasant, that juror will be inclined to assess the
female plaintiff’s performance evaluations as true reflections of a person
who is hard to work with, regardless of gender. 71 Likewise, if a juror is
inclined to believe that a female subordinate is more likely to have
seduced her boss than he is to have harassed her, that juror is inclined to
disbelieve a woman’s allegation of sexual harassment and retaliation.72
These implicit biases against women can form the lens through which the

66. Dan Brekke, Ellen Pao vs. Kleiner Perkins: Jury Rejects Gender Discrimination Claims,
KQED NEWS (Mar. 27, 2015) https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/03/24/final-arguments-in-ellen-paogender-discrimination-trial/ [http://perma.cc/P37A-5PLK].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Heather Kelly, Ellen Pao Drops Appeal, Will Pay Kleiner Perkins $276K,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 10, 2015) http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/10/technology/ellen-pao-kleinerperkins-case-ends/index.html [http://perma.cc/SJJ2-GNTX] (explaining that Pao lost on all four
counts and received no monetary award; she was later ordered to pay Kleiner $276,000 in legal costs
and fees).
70. See generally Kang et al., supra note 12 (noting that explicit biases of jurors pose a different
threat to fairness than the threat posed by people with implicit biases who remain on a jury).
71. See id.; see generally Shelley Correll & Caroline Simard, Research: Vague Feedback is
Holding Women Back, HARV. BUS. REV. (2016); see also Hon. Cheryl Ann Krause, From the Bench:
Moving Beyond Gender: Effective Deployment of the Legal Arsenal, 43 A.B.A. J. LITIG. 66 (2017).
72. Brekke, supra note 66.
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jury views the facts, thus negating any practical application of second
generation discrimination.
C.

Wal-Mart v. Dukes

Wal-Mart v. Dukes is an employment discrimination lawsuit filed in
federal court in 2001, grounded in the law protecting women from genderbased discrimination in the workplace. 73 The case alleged, based on the
experience of lead plaintiff Betty Dukes and others, that Wal-Mart made
promotion decisions that favored male employees and paid women less
than their male counterparts in comparable positions. 74 At base, the
plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s corporate policy of allowing individual
managers to make discretionary pay and promotion decisions created a
corporate culture that discriminated against women, while allowing male
employees to succeed and advance.75 The Dukes plaintiffs did not allege
that Wal-Mart had an express corporate policy against the advancement
of women, rather the plaintiffs complained that the “local managers’
discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in
favor of men, leading to an unlawful disparate impact on female
employees.” 76 Plaintiffs further alleged that because Wal-Mart was aware
that its policies had the effect of disadvantaging female employees, its
refusal to alter the policies allowing manager discretion amounted to
disparate impact, making Wal-Mart liable to all employees negatively
affected by the discretionary pay and promotion policies. 77 The lawsuit,
styled as a class action lawsuit brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), sought
injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay, and punitive damages. 78
The lawsuit reached the United States Supreme Court by Wal-Mart’s
appeal of a district court decision certifying the class, which was affirmed
by the court of appeals. 79 The focus of Wal-Mart’s appeal was on the
decision to certify the class identified as consisting of “all women
employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since
December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s
73. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
74. Id. at 343-45.
75. Id. at 345.
76. Id. at 344.
77. Id. at 345.
78. Id.; see also Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (allowing class actions
to meet the subject matter jurisdiction requirements for federal court if minimal diversity is met and
the aggregated claims of the class members are in excess of $5,000,000.00); FED. R. CIV. P. 23
(analyzing in Wal-Mart v. Dukes whether the lawsuit met the prerequisite of commonality under Rule
23(a)(2)).
79. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 347-48.
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challenged pay and management track promotions policies and
procedures.” 80 The plaintiff class was estimated at 1.5 million persons and
thought to be one of the largest class actions ever, particularly in the
context of a Title VII gender discrimination or disparate impact lawsuit. 81
As the Court noted, the size of Wal-Mart’s operations and total number of
employees nationwide created the risk of large-scale action if Wal-Mart
employed discriminatory practices in evaluating employees for promotion
and pay increases. 82 The scale of the lawsuit, when combined with the
disparate impact theory, created an ambitious proposition for litigation.
The plaintiffs would have to show not that one, a few, or even a district of
Wal-Mart’s female employees were adversely impacted by the
discretionary pay and promotion policies, but that all female employees
had suffered harm. Given that pay and promotion policies were
discretionary, thus unique to every store, region, or district, the alignment
of all female employees into one class created insurmountable difficulties
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, particularly the requirement
that all members of the class share questions of law and fact in common. 83
Although not the primary purpose of this Article, the Rule 23 context
of the Court’s decision is important to the case’s role in the overall
analysis of implicit bias. The Rule 23(a) requirement of commonality
forms one of four prerequisites to class certification, regardless of the
remedies sought. 84 Traditionally, the class’s ability to demonstrate at the
certification stage that all the class members shared common questions of
fact or law rested largely on the description of the class as provided in the
Complaint. 85 Through early workplace discrimination cases, plaintiffs
learned that a certain type of overreaching in the class description could
lead to a failure to certify a class under Rule 23.86 For example, attempts
to certify classes of workers who were not promoted based on a
discriminatory reason in the same lawsuit with persons who were not
hired based on discriminatory reasons failed the commonality requirement
because the class contained two distinct groups of persons who had

80. Id. at 346.
81. Id. at 342.
82. Id. at 345.
83. Id. at 359-60; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The Rule 23(a) prerequisites are: “(1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Id.
85. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982).
86. Id. at 156-58.
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suffered differing injuries. 87 In those cases, the common feature was the
defendant; the same employer had acted against both current and
prospective employees.
In the Dukes lawsuit, the class description limited itself to female
employees at United States retail stores after December 26, 1998. 88 The
class was further limited to those female employees who had been
subjected to the relevant policies. 89 Estimates on the numerical size of the
class were based on Wal-Mart’s employee data, but the actual numerical
size of the class could only be determined after the class was certified and
given notice of the action. 90 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
identified early in the opinion that “the crux of this case is
commonality.” 91 Justice Scalia noted that the mere fact that a group of
employees all claim to have been discriminated against by their employer
is insufficient to show commonality—the claims must depend on a
“common contention.” 92 “‘What matters to class certification . . . is not
the raising of common “questions” . . . but rather the capacity of a
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.’” 93 Based on this broad reading of the
commonality requirement, the Court found that establishing commonality
“necessarily overlaps” with an analysis of plaintiffs’ claims that Wal-Mart
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. 94
The commonality analysis served as the Court’s platform to analyze
the plaintiff class’s Title VII claim based on the theory of second
generation discrimination. 95 Second generation discrimination stands
apart from first generation discrimination as it involves subtle actions and
patterns of preference that exclude certain groups over time. 96 First
generation discrimination involves easy-to-recognize, blatant
87. Id. at 151, 158.
88. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 346.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 349.
92. Id. at 350 (“[T]he mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered
a Title VII injury . . . gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at
once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.”).
93. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
94. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 352 (“In this case, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps
with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of
discrimination.”).
95. Sturm, supra note 11, at 460.
96. Id. (calling such claims “second generation” discrimination claims because they are
“difficult to trace directly to intentional, discrete actions of particular actors”).
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discrimination, such as has been litigated in Title VII cases since the
1970s. 97 The Court in Dukes recognized that second generation
discrimination was a viable theory of recovery under Title VII, and even
noted that giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can create liability
for the employer under a disparate impact theory of discrimination, as a
“‘system of subjective decision-making [can have] precisely the same
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination.’” 98 But the Court imparted that the fact that one manager
may use discretion inappropriately does not create a common question of
law or fact for the entire employee class. 99 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, found that to certify the class the plaintiffs must show a common
mode of exercising discretion that affects all employees in the
company. 100
In reaching this decision, the Court conducted what was, for all
intents and purposes, a merits analysis of plaintiffs’ claim. The court
reviewed and rejected three categories of evidence the plaintiffs brought
forth to show the company-wide effect of the discretionary pay and
promotion policies. First, the plaintiffs had submitted statistical evidence
regarding the disparities in pay and promotion for female employees
throughout Wal-Mart retail stores. 101 The Court found the evidence
insufficient to show commonality, noting that even if the data showed
disparities across regions or across the nation, it was insufficient to show
how the challenged employment practice tied together the claims of
approximately 1.5 million employees. 102 In this regard, the Court
suggested that the plaintiff class members needed individual proof of
injury, a position completely inapposite to class action litigation. The
plaintiffs also submitted anecdotal evidence—statements from female
employees at various retail stores. 103 The Court found this evidence
insufficient in type and quality, stating that even if every statement was

97. Id. at 466.
98. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
990-91 (1988)).
99. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355-56.
100. Id. at 359 (“Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide
discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the
existence of any common question.”).
101. Id. at 356-57.
102. Id. at 357 (“Even if it established (as it does not) a pay or promotion pattern that differs
from the nationwide figures or the regional figures in all of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores, that would still
not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists.”).
103. Id. at 358.
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true, the evidence was not enough to demonstrate company-wide
discrimination. 104
The majority’s review of the evidence submitted at the certification
stage and its analysis of the second generation discrimination claim under
Title VII contain several outstanding observations which belie the
majority’s inability to understand the difficulties women have navigating
the mixed-gender workplace. Notably, the Court finds that managers are
unlikely to rely on gender-based criteria when using discretion to promote
or raise pay for employees. 105 The Court reasoned that the manager would
be unlikely to do so when there are corporate policies that forbid sex
discrimination.106 This analysis assumes that the supervising managers are
all of impeccable character and will defer at all times to the company’s
direction. What is more likely, however, is that the store manager will see
the company’s gender discrimination policies as legal requirements the
company must publish and any training on those matters as a part of the
job he must endure. He is also more likely to promote people he likes,
regardless of gender. 107 If his preferences create greater affinities with
other men, then those employees stand a greater chance at promotion. 108
This type of self-replication is not novel—people have been advancing
the careers of others like themselves since time immemorial. As Justice
Ginsberg noted in her dissent:

104. Id. (“Even if every single one of these accounts is true, that would not demonstrate that the
entire company ‘operate[s] under a general policy of discrimination’ which is what respondents must
show to certify a companywide class.”) (internal citations omitted).
105. Id. at 355 (“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most
managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performancebased criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose
to reward various attributes that produce disparate impact – such as scores on general aptitude test or
educational achievements.”) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 357 (“Some managers will
claim that the availability of women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores’ area
does not mirror the national or regional statistics. And almost all of them will claim to have been
applying some sex-neutral, performance-based criteria—whose nature and effects will differ from
store to store.”).
106. Id. at 355.
107. See generally Elizabeth Sarine, Regulating the Social Pollution of Systemic Discrimination
Caused by Implicit Bias, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1359 (2012); see, e.g., Dr. Arin N. Reeves, Written in
Black and White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills, NEXTIONS
YELLOW PAPER SERIES (2014), http://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-blackand-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf [http://perma.cc/UDV4-MSK6]. In the study by Dr. Reeves, a
memo that included grammatical and analytical mistakes was disseminated to 60 law partners. Half
of the partners were informed the memo writer was a black third-year student at NYU and half were
told the writer was a white third-year student at NYU. For the exact same memo, the black writer
scored an average rating of 3.2 out of 5 and the white writer scored an average rating of 4.1 out of 5.
Id.
108. Sarine, supra note 107, at 1368.
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Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are
unaware. The risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers
are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that
perpetuates gender stereotypes. 109

The practice Justice Ginsberg describes has even been elevated to an
art under the label “mentoring,” 110 where mentors are those in the position
to bring along others. But if the mentors are men, and those men tend to
self-replicate in their selections for mentees, the collective effect of that
subjective process in an organization is gender discrimination. Despite its
reference to second generation discrimination as a viable Title VII theory,
the Dukes majority was blind to the reality of workplace exclusion. The
Court’s blindness delivered the fatal blow to Betty Dukes and her coworkers.
III. IMPLICIT GENDER BIAS AND SECOND GENERATION DISCRIMINATION
Ellen Pao and Betty Dukes both worked in environments where
implicit bias operated underground, allowing workplace policies to erupt
into full-fledged workplace discrimination. The unifying component in
both cases is male-dominated leadership at the top. In both cases, the
predominantly male leadership was not allowed, through the workplace
structure, to interact with women colleagues at the same level. Thus, there
was little opportunity for male supervisors to challenge their own implicit
understanding of male to female differences in society and, more
specifically, in the workplace. If a male supervisor believes women are
more emotional and his experiences validate this bias, he will have
difficulty overcoming this bias when interacting with women in the
workplace. Without malice, the male supervisor may operate on a
presumption that men make better managers, as males are less emotional
and more operational. If these implicit biases can operate without
challenge, either through structural policies or a lack of cross-gender
interaction, the result is a homogeneous workplace where female

109. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 372-73 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
110. See Caela Farren, Eight Types of Mentors: Which Ones Do You Need?, MASTERYWORKS,
INC.
(2006), http://www.masteryworks.com/newsite/downloads/article3_eighttypesofmentorswhichonesdoyouneed.pdf [http://perma.cc/373U-NSXQ] (“Mentoring is a learning and development
partnership between a professional with in-depth experience and knowledge in a specific area and a
protégé seeking learning and coaching in the same area.”); see also BUSINESS DICTIONARY, Definition
of Mentoring, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/mentoring.html (last visited July 5,
2017) (“[Mentoring is an] [e]mployee training system under which a senior or more experienced
individual (the mentor) is assigned to act as an advisor, counselor, or guide to a junior or trainee. The
mentor is responsible for providing support to, and feedback on, the individual in his or her charge.”).
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employees cannot ascend. This implicit bias and its consequences are at
the core of the existing theory of second generation discrimination, as
alleged by Dukes and Pao, and the new theory of Third Generation
Discrimination.
A.

First Generation Discrimination

The first generation of gender-based discrimination cases dealt with
workplace policies that appear draconian by 21st century standards. Early
cases involved women struggling simply to attain simple job retention and
security. 111 The relative meaning of the word “sex” within the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, specifically within Title VII, was tested through a series of
early cases. 112 Ida Phillips, who was denied even an opportunity to apply
for a position on the assembly line at Martin-Marietta Corporation
because she had preschool-aged children, was vindicated when the United
States Supreme Court ruled that Title VII required that “persons of like
qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of sex.” 113
Brenda Mieth sued the state of Alabama when she was denied the
opportunity to be an Alabama State Trooper because she weighed less
than 160 pounds. 114 Her lawsuit revealed the 160 pound rule 115 as a thin

111. See generally THOMAS, supra note 2 (examining court cases focused on women’s attempts
to secure rights in the workplace).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) (emphasis
added).
113. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curium).
114. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp.
1169, 1171-74 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Plaintiff Mieth’s case was combined and filed as a class action
against the same defendant. Plaintiff Rawlinson had been denied a position as a Correctional
Counselor in the Alabama Prison System because she did not meet the height and weight requirements
for that position. Both women alleged the height and weight requirements violated Title VII. Id.
115. Mieth, 418 F. Supp. at 1173 (“[R]equires the following qualification [for an Alabama State
Trooper]: (1) Graduation from a standard senior high school or GED certificate; (2) Possession, upon
appointment, of a valid Alabama driver’s license; (3) Passage of a physical examination equivalent
to that established by the United States Army; (4) Measure at least 5 feet, 9 inches in height without
shoes and weigh at least 160 pounds without clothing; (5) Sound teeth and vision correctible to 20/20,
free from color blindness; (6) Be between the ages of 21 and 36 years; (7) Must never have been
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving either force, violence, moral turpitude or serious
traffic violations.”). The qualifications for an Alabama Corrections Counselor were substantially
similar, requiring that the applicant fell between the minimum height and weight requirements of 5
feet, 2 inches, 120 pounds and the maximum of 6 feet, 10 inches and 300 pounds. Id.
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veil over the department’s true purpose—not to have any women as
Alabama State Troopers—and challenged the argument that physical
strength was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 116 of law
enforcement. 117 The Court found there was room for an exception to job
requirements which have a “disparate impact” on women, and that the
BFOQ in question must be correlated to the job and effective at
determining the necessary job requirement. 118
Another important round of first generation cases involved women
suing employers under Title VII for sexual misconduct in the workplace.
These cases expanded the legal heft of Title VII and outed a workplace
indignity women had endured for years. In the most noteworthy case,
Michelle Vinson suffered through years of relentless harassment by her
supervisor at Meritor Savings Bank before finally seeking legal advice
and filing suit under Title VII. 119 Her case, one of the first to bring suit on
this theory, came to trial before a judge who disregarded Vinson’s
testimony, questioning the very existence of a sexual relationship because
Vinson failed to complain about her boss to upper management,
ultimately, ruling in favor of the defendant. 120 Only through appeals did
Vinson receive relief when the United States Supreme Court held that
“when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex”
under Title VII, thus adding the hostile work environment theory of sexual

116. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (2012). The statute explains it is not unlawful to base
employment decisions on the employee’s religion, sex, or national origin “in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .” Id.
117. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334. Dothard held that the defendants failed to rebut the
plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination by showing that strength was an essential characteristic
of the job or that the height and weight restrictions were adequate to gauge strength. However, the
Court found that the physical requirements could constitute a BFOQ per §703(e) of Title VII upon a
showing that the female prison guards could create a security threat in Alabama’s maximum security
prisons, which are “characterized by rampant violence and a jungle atmosphere.” Id.
118. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall dissented from the application of the
BFOQ exception applied here, noting that “the real disqualifying factor in the Court’s view is ‘(t)he
employee’s very womanhood.’” Justice Marshall further stated that “the danger in this emotionally
laden context is that common sense will be used to mask the ‘romantic paternalism’ and persisting
discriminatory attitudes . . . .” Id.
119. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
120. See Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C. 1980), rev’d 753 F.2d 141(D.C.
Cir. 1985) At a bench trial before Judge John Barret Penn, Vinson was not allowed to offer evidence
of other incidents of sexual harassment involving the same supervisor, Taylor, and other female
employees or evidence of Vinson’s medical treatment after being sexually assaulted by Taylor. Judge
Penn limited Vinson’s evidence to her testimony and treated the case as a “he said/she said” case,
completely disregarding Vinson’s core allegation of workplace discrimination. Id.
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harassment as another basis for gender-based workplace discrimination
lawsuits under Title VII. 121
As this first generation of workplace discrimination litigation moved
into the 1980s, employers began to adjust by creating policies that avoided
discrimination against women generally, including pregnant women and
women with children. 122 Social norms adjusted as well, marked by
protests and other political statements offered in response to Title VII
litigation and the Court’s apparent support for gender-based workplace
discrimination cases under Title VII. 123 Despite this growth and change,
other more subtle types of discrimination led to court challenges.
Pricewater House v. Hopkins is notable. 124 Hopkins was denied a
partnership in a prestigious accounting firm and sued her employer under
Title VII. 125 The case brought forth evidence of Hopkins’s employee
evaluations, revealing how private conversations among men about
women can contain the same discriminatory imperative as overt
statements and actions. 126 Hopkins’s partnership evaluations contradicted
the firm’s positive partnership nominating statement by criticizing her
“unduly harsh” manner and suggesting she be more feminine in her
manner. 127 Her partnership application was put on “hold” and Hopkins
was counseled by her mentor to “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have your hair styled,
and wear jewelry.” 128 Hopkins was in a “double-bind” situation—if a
121. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (explaining that the Supreme Court accepted the EEOC Guidelines
regarding hostile environment sexual harassment as violating Title VII, comparing sexual harassment
to various actionable forms of racial harassment).
122. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curium); Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (upholding California law protecting a women’s job while
she is out on maternity leave as consistent with Title VII).
123. See generally THOMAS, supra note 2 (examining the ways in which social norms changed
as a result of societal pressure and litigation).
124. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
125. Id. at 228.
126. Id. at 234-35; see also Benjamin Artz et al., Do Women Ask, 1127 WARWICK ECON. RES.
PAPER SERIES, July 2016 (concluding that women do ask for salary increases but receive less, which
challenges the general hypothesis that women do not ask because they are worried about workplace
relationships); see also Correll & Simard, supra note 71.
127. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233-35 (“Virtually all of the partners’ negative remarks
about Hopkins—even those of partners supporting her—had to do with her ‘interpersonal skills.’ Both
‘[s]upporters and opponents of her candidacy . . . indicated that she was sometimes overly aggressive,
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff.’”).
128. Id. at 235 (“But it was the man who, as Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for
explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board’s decision to place her candidacy on hold who
delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas Beyer advised,
Hopkins should ‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”).
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woman is seen as feminine she will be viewed as less competent, but if
she is seen as masculine she will be less likeable. 129 Hopkins argued this
“double-bind” was based on stereotypes and amounted to gender
discrimination. 130 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the partners
had engaged in sex stereotyping, which led to her partnership denial and
amounted to a Title VII violation. 131 Hopkins’s case, which bears an eerie
factual similarity to Ellen Pao’s case, is considered one of the first
examples of second generation discrimination. 132
B.

Second Generation Discrimination

Second generation discrimination, also known as structural
discrimination, is a theory developed by Columbia Professor Susan Sturm
as a means to pursue relief for workplace discrimination under Title
VII. 133 In her groundbreaking 2001 article, Sturm explored the role of
implicit bias in workplace policies and established a legal theory that
argued implicit bias among supervisors or managers; stating that those
persons holding higher positions in the workplace hierarchy lead to
policies which favor the majority demographics, typically white and
male. 134
The theory argues that gender-based discrimination flows from
“ongoing patterns of interaction shaped by organizational culture.” 135 The
interactions, particularly those interactions between male employees,
influence access, workplace conditions, and the opportunities for

129. See Brief for Am. Psychol. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 37, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae].
The theory of implicit bias-based workplace discrimination was developed in this brief and through
other testimony in Price Waterhouse.
130. Id.
131. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. The Court noted further that “[a]n employer who
objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” In evaluating the testimony regarding sex
stereotyping offered by Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Susan Fiske, the Court noted that “[i]t takes no special
training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a
course at charm school.’ Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer’s memorable advice to Hopkins, does it
require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.” Id. at 256.
132. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 928-29 (2016); see also Sturm, supra note 11, at 468.
133. See generally Sturm, supra note 11.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 470.
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advancement over time. 136 If the group that controls access, conditions,
and opportunities is all male, that group will begin to define “fit” and
“success” in terms of those who fit and are successful in the workplace
environment. 137 The result is that traits deemed as masculine will take on
a positive cast in the workplace, whereas traits deemed as more feminine
will be unusual, misunderstood, and devalued in a male-dominated
workplace environment. 138 Ultimately, the male-dominated culture can
lead to overt statements of bias, but second generation theory cases do not
typically involve bad actors who harass and discriminate in the manner
more easily prosecuted under Title VII. 139 Rather, the bias-based culture
works to affirm sexual stereotypes, thus confirming the biases of male
workers—whether conscious or unconscious—and leading to a
discriminatory workplace environment for women who attempt to join or
advance. 140 Sturm notes the discriminatory effect of “sex segregation and
marginalization” in a workplace environment where stereotype-based
biases impact overall workplace culture. 141 Comments or behavior, which
may not lead to gender exclusion in an integrated environment, can be
discriminatory when occurring in a workplace environment that is maledominated and not diverse. 142
Sturm uses the following law firm example to define the key features
of second generation discrimination:
Consider a large law firm in which complaints have surfaced about a
series of issues involving gender. Almost half of the firm’s associates
are women, but the representation of women drops off precipitously at
the senior associate/junior partner level. The firm’s senior management

136. Id. at 471.
137. Id. at 470-74; see also Artz et al., supra note 126.
138. See Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 11-14 (examining gender stereotypes in the legal
profession) (citing Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J., 401, 439 (2003)).
139. Sturm, supra note 11, at 471; see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986); see generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Teresa Harris sued her employer for
sexual harassment after being forced to quit her job to avoid her supervisor’s sexual advances. She
appealed her case to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that a hostile
environment cannot be proven by one single factor and struck down a requirement that the plaintiff
alleging a hostile environment show psychological harm. Id.
140. Sturm, supra note 11, at 471-75.
141. Id. at 471 (“The overall organizational culture affects the extent to which particular acts
produce bias in a given workplace. Comments or behavior occurring in conjunction with sex
segregation and marginalization may be discriminatory, while the same statements may produce little
gender exclusion in a more integrated context.”).
142. Id.
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is almost entirely male. Several firm departments, such as tax and mergers and acquisitions, have particularly low numbers of women. Lawyers at this firm “work around the clock” and frequently collaborate on
large and complex cases. For many lawyers, the law firm functions as
both their professional and social community. Decision[-]making about
personnel issues is largely subjective and discretionary, with little systemic assessment of its efficacy or fairness. Advancement depends upon
informal decisions about assignment of cases, access to training, and exposure to significant clients. Mentoring of new lawyers, which is also
crucial to professional success, blurs the line between personal and professional interaction.
A group of women has questioned recent decisions denying women promotion to partnership, the firm’s general failure to retain and promote
women despite comparable entry credentials, and a series of individual
incidents that triggered complaints of sexual harassment and gender
bias. In part because the firm aggressively recruits women at the entry
level and fails to track patterns in work assignment and promotion, the
firm’s management has been largely unaware of any problem until these
complaints arose. The complaints involved a range of issues: differences
in patterns of work assignment and training opportunities among men
and women; tolerance of a sexualized work environment by partners
who are otherwise significant ‘rainmakers;’ routine comments by male
lawyers, particularly in the predominantly male departments, on the appearance, sexuality, and competence of women; harsh assessments of
women’s capacities and work styles based on gender stereotypes; avoidance of work-related contact with women by members of particular departments; and hyper-scrutiny of women’s performance by some, and
the invisibility of women’s contributions to others. These complaints
coincide with a concern about low morale and productivity among diverse work teams. Upon examination, the firm discovers dramatic differences in the retention and promotion rates of men and women in the
firm. 143

In Sturm’s law firm example, the firm has developed recruitment practices
that encourage hiring female associates, but it has failed to create a culture
that allows female associates to achieve and advance. The failure of the
firm to assess its internal culture relative to its diversity goal leads to the
type of homogeneous environment characteristic of workplaces where
female employees experience second generation discrimination.
Second generation gender discrimination addresses a complex
problem as the discriminatory behaviors are based in attitudes, which a

143.

Id. at 469-71.
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person may not understand he possesses. 144 In a law firm environment like
the example, it is unlikely the senior management partners and the lawyers
in the male-dominated practice areas view themselves as persons who are
biased against women. 145 If asked about gender bias, they are most likely
to state they support equal access for male and female lawyers, they would
welcome more qualified women into the firm’s upper levels, and they
have worked with many talented female lawyers.146 And although some
men may offer these remarks as cover for gender-based attitudes about the
roles of men and women in the workplace and the home, most do not have
a conscious understanding of bias in their workplaces or elsewhere. The
role of implicit bias, the unconscious bias based on stereotypes that
manifests in attitudes and behavior, is most impactful in sex-segregated
environments, where exclusionary behavior goes unchallenged. 147
Sturm recognizes three possible constructs within the theory of
second generation discrimination. 148 First, the workplace utilizes a
facially-neutral policy, in which the bias-based discrimination violates a
“norm of functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment” by
applying a facially-neutral practice or policy to a group of similarly
situated employees. 149 In this construct, the focus is on a group of
employees that is predominantly female, such that female employees are
disproportionately impacted by the practice or policy. 150 The second
construct contemplates the effect of formal policies on the dominant
group, evaluating whether a workplace policy violates a norm of equal
access. 151 The third construct contemplates stereotype and bias, analyzing
144. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1126.
145. See generally Levinson & Young, supra note 16; see also Stella Tsai & Debra Rosen,
Litigation Woman Advocate, Know Thyself: Affinity Bias in the Legal Profession, ABA (Mar. 9,
2015),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/womanadvocate/articles/winter20150315-know-thyself-affinity-bias-legal-profession.html [http://perma.cc/X4NC-LS7C] (noting that
thinking about bias can make bias worse if the senior lawyers do not see themselves as biased and do
not understand the need to explore bias issues in their business settings).
146. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995)
(discussing the role of “schema” in developing implicit biases and errors in judgment caused by the
use of schema); see also Correll & Simard, supra note 71 (noting that men may employ a “protective
hesitation” when giving feedback to women, barring women from critical feedback needed to advance
their careers).
147. See Sturm, supra note 11, at 471.
148. Id. at 473-74.
149. Id. (“One such theory would apply to decisions or conditions that violate a norm of
functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment.”).
150. Id. (“This theory defines discrimination to include differences in treatment based on group
membership, whether consciously motivated or not, that produce unequal outcomes.”).
151. Id. (“Second generation bias could also violate a norm of equal access, which defines
discrimination to include employment decisions that are formally fair but functionally biased in favor
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the effect of using sex stereotyping to exclude. 152 These three constructs
create a self-perpetuating cycle of discriminatory policies and actions,
labeled here as the Second Generation Discrimination Continuum (see
Figure 1.1).
The Dukes case was premised on the theory of second generation
discrimination, challenging Wal-Mart’s policies and practices as defined
by the unchallenged implicit biases of male supervisors who had the
discretion to promote from within. 153 The outcome and reasoning in
Dukes highlights the complexity of second generation discrimination
theory as each of the theory’s three constructs were at issue. First, the
discretionary promotion policies at Wal-Mart invoked the first construct,
labeled as Phase I on the Continuum, in that the formal policies of
promotion focused on group membership. The discretionary promotion
policy allowed a manager to promote from a group of retail employees. 154
The policy was not directed at women, but at a group of employees. 155 At
Wal-Mart that group of employees was predominantly female. 156 The
discretionary promotion policy regulated the availability of promotion for
this group, and the Dukes plaintiffs argued these facially-neutral policies
hindered female employees’ access to management positions. 157 The use
of a discretionary promotion policy allowing the managers to evaluate the
entire group negated any apparent discriminatory effect of the promotion
policies, as the policies applied to the full group of eligible retail

of the dominant group by using criteria that advantage one group over another for arbitrary reasons,
meaning reasons that do not advance the articulated goals of the employment decision.”).
152. Id. at 474 (“A third possibility is that these subtle, exclusionary practices violate an
antisubordination principle, which itself is a plural normative category that could include
stereotyping, gender policing, undermining women’s competence, or maintaining gender or racial
hierarchy.”).
153. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344 (2011); see also Roger W. Reinsch
& Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There from Here: Implications of the Wal-Mart v. Dukes Decision for
Addressing Second Generation Discrimination, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 264, 280 (2014) (“Dukes
fundamentally changed how courts address second-generation discrimination . . . .”).
154. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343 (“Wal-Mart permits store managers to apply their own
subjective criteria when selecting candidates as ‘support managers,’ which is the first step on the path
to management.”).
155. Id. (explaining that all hourly retail employees were theoretically eligible for promotion to
an entry level management position as a “support manager,” thus the group effected by the facially
neutral promotion policy consisted of all non-management Wal-Mart employees).
156. Id. at 370 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (explaining that female employees constituted 70% of
the hourly jobs in the retail stores and only 33% of the management positons at the time of the lawsuit).
157. Id. at 344 (“These plaintiffs, respondents here, do not allege that Wal-Mart has any express
corporate policy against the advancement of women. Rather, they claim that their local managers’
discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an
unlawful disparate impact on female employees . . . .”).
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employees, and thus were not targeted at the female employees. 158
However, when allowed to operate in a sex-segregated environment,
where biases existed and were unchallenged, the effect of this formal
policy was to functionally marginalize the female employees.159
The second construct in second generation discrimination, labeled
Phase II on the Continuum, evaluates whether a workplace policy violates
a norm of equal access, considering employment decisions that are
formally fair, but functionally biased in favor of the dominant group 160
(see Figure 1.1). In Dukes, the discretionary promotion policy was
formally fair—it allowed promotion for any eligible employee. 161 It was
the male-dominated management that allowed this formally fair policy to
become functionally biased as managers promoted persons like
themselves. 162 Also, Wal-Mart’s promotion policy included criteria like
the ability to relocate, a qualification more accessible to men in traditional
families where the male head of household can move and the family will
follow. 163 By allowing these policies to operate unchecked by corporate
supervisors, the policies favored the dominant group—the male
employees.
Wal-Mart’s policies and practices also implicated the third construct
of second generation discrimination, labeled as Phase III on the
Continuum, which addresses the effect of using sex stereotyping to
exclude. 164 If male managers witnessed the exclusion of women as less
suited to management, through the relocation policy or otherwise, those
male managers were then validated in their beliefs that men were better
candidates for promotion. The corporate culture evolved from there into a
culture with male-dominated management—a single-sex environment
that offered no check on bias. 165

158. Id.
159. See id. at 371 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
160. See Sturm, supra note 11, at 473.
161. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343 (“Admission to Wal-Mart’s management training program,
however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria, including an above-average
performance rating, at least one year’s tenure in the applicant’s current position, and a willingness to
relocate.”).
162. Id. at 372-73 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see also Reinsch & Goltz, supra note 153, at 264,
279.
163. See generally Williams, supra note 138; Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 370 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsberg’s dissent noted the complexity of a relocation requirement for working
women who may not be the sole income in the family or may require family support to maintain a
job. Id.
164. See Sturm, supra note 11, at 465.
165. See id. at 473.
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The third construct doubles back to the first, and a continuum of
unchecked bias develops: facially-neutral formal policies develop, the
formal policies are applied disproportionately based on the gender
demographics of the subject group of employees, the female employees
have restricted access under the formal policies, the male employees
access management as a favored dominant group, and the male-dominated
manager group is allowed to employ discretion based on sex stereotypes
unchecked by a formal corporate practice. This interplay between the
three constructs creates a continuum wherein the result is a continuous
culture of bias and discrimination (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum 166

Phase III: The
workplace becomes sex
segregated allowing
implicit bias to operate
• Unchecked implicit bias can
lead to facially neutral
policies that discriminate and
favor the dominant group.

Phase I: Facially
neutral policy functions
as discriminatory

Phase II: Facially
neutral policy favors
the dominant group
• The dominant group
occupies the
management/supervisory
positions

166. See generally Sturm, supra note 11. The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum
diagramed here is intended to visually represent Sturm’s description of the various theories, herein
called constructs that are components of the general theory of second generation discrimination. In
considering Sturm’s description, it became apparent how these components work together in a
workplace to create a culture where the dominant group is able to discriminate, perhaps without
conscious knowledge of the discrimination, further marginalizing the subordinate group(s).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss1/2

28

Dunham: Third Generation Discrimination

2017]

THIRD GENERATION DISCRIMINATION

83

Ellen Pao argued the effect of the Continuum in her case against
Kleiner. 167 First she argued Phase I, that facially-neutral policies on
promotion to partner were operating to functionally prohibit women from
advancement. 168 As opposed to Wal-Mart in the Dukes case, where the
retail employee group eligible for promotion was predominantly female,
Pao’s group of Kleiner executives eligible for partnership was
predominantly male. 169 Even so, the facially-neutral policies functioned
in a discriminatory manner when applied to the female candidates. 170
Kleiner relied on supervisor recommendations in evaluating executives
for partnership. 171
In fact, the facts in Pao’s case are frightfully similar to the facts in
Price Waterhouse. 172 Pao, like Hopkins, was groomed for partnership,
being given responsibilities commensurate with partnership, and
encouraged that she was moving forward in the company. 173 Also like
Hopkins, Pao struggled with the masculine/feminine balance in her
workplace. 174 Both women received simultaneous criticism for being
abrupt, yet weak. 175 Both women were considered interpersonally
difficult, with reviews that reported masculine behavior, such as cursing
and shouting, and being “difficult” to work with in various ways. 176 Both
women struggled with the “double-bind” associated with being a woman
in a man’s career. 177 The facially-neutral rules regarding partnership at
Kleiner and Price Waterhouse were not discriminatory; however, the
over-reliance on partner evaluations, specifically the interpersonal
167. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 37.
168. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25, 34-36.
169. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
170. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 23, 27, 30; Kleiner Trial Brief, supra note 51, at 6.
171. Kleiner Trial Brief, supra note 51, at 6.
172. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
233 (1989).
173. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
174. Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 34, 37, 40; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
175. See generally Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235;
Correll & Simard, supra note 71 (“Stereotypes about women’s capabilities mean that reviewers are
less likely to connect women’s contributions to business outcomes or to acknowledge their technical
expertise.”).
176. Kleiner Trial Brief, supra note 51, at 6 (asserting that Pao was labeled “territorial” while
also criticized as “reluctant to speak out.”); see also Correll & Simard, supra note 71. An analysis of
200 performance reviews in a large tech company showed women tended to receive vague feedback,
whereas men were more likely to receive developmental feedback targeted to business outcomes. The
study also showed negative feedback to women tended to focus more on communication and
interpersonal skills. Id.
177. See generally Correll & Simard, supra note 71; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
235.
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reviews of the candidates, turned neutral policies into policies that
functioned in a discriminatory manner, limiting the ability of women to
advance to partnership. 178
The discriminatory effect of Phase I moves the Continuum forward
to Phase II wherein the male employee is part of a favored dominant group
for management positions. The facially-neutral partnership evaluation
policies at Kleiner and Price Waterhouse worked effectively for the male
candidates attempting to advance into a partner group composed of other
men. Although the same weight may have been given to evaluations for
both men and women, men’s evaluations generally contained less
negative assessments regarding interpersonal behavior. 179 If the male
candidate was harsh or abrupt, his behavior may have been overlooked as
it was expected of men in the firm’s culture, or it may have been praised
as signs of intelligence, seriousness, or competence.180 Thus, evaluations
have different weight in a sex-segregated environment where male culture
dominates. 181 As a result, the policies act to favor the dominant group and,
therefore, more men are made partner.182
The Continuum then moves into the Third Phase—the maledominated partner group is allowed to evaluate others based on sex
stereotypes unchecked by a formal corporate practice.183 At Kleiner and
Price Waterhouse, the majority of partners were men. 184 To the extent
those men held implicit biases against women, those biases were allowed
to operate unchecked either by corporate policy or by cross-gender
integration. There were no women in the upper hierarchy to police the
application of facially-neutral partnership evaluation policies. 185 Also, the
178. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
179. See generally Correll & Simard, supra note 71; see also Levinson & Young, supra note
16, at 11-13 (“[W]omen are hindered from career advancement by stereotypes that peg them as home
and family-focused, as well as those that construe their personalities as weak and gossipdriven . . . .”).
180. Correll & Simard, supra note 71, at 3.
181. Id.
182. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that at
the time of Hopkin’s candidacy for partner at Price Waterhouse, seven out of the firm’s 662 partners
were women); Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 34; Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4; see also
Levinson & Young, supra note 16, at 4 (reporting on a 2009 NAWL study finding that in the nation’s
200 largest law firms, only 6% have female managing partners, 15% have women on the management
committee, and fewer than 16% of equity partners are women) (citing National Association of Women
Lawyers & The NAWL Foundation, Report of the Fourth Annual National Survey on Retention and
Promotion of Women in Law Firms (2009)).
183. See Sturm, supra note 11, at 494.
184. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 462; Pao Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 34; Pao Trial Brief, supra note
36, at 4.
185. Pao Trial Brief, supra note 36, at 4.
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male partners had few women colleagues to interact with, thus greatly
reducing the possibility that implicit biases against women would be
displaced by interaction with same-level colleagues. 186 Without a check
on the firms’ policies, the male partners have no incentive to change or
improve policies, thus allowing sex stereotyping and implicit bias to
continue to operate in the firms’ institutional culture. In both Pao and
Price Waterhouse, unchecked sex stereotyping is evident in the
partnership evaluations. 187
Undoubtedly, litigation, which revealed the language in partner
evaluations as evidence of the Title VII claims, led to changed practices.
Imagine that Kleiner changed its evaluation policies after Pao’s suit to
remove narrative comments from the relevant form, allowing partners to
provide only a numbered score on evaluations. If so, the new evaluations
would have to be approved by male management. If the male management
possesses implicit biases against women in the tech and banking
industries, it is unlikely the new evaluation forms will take the second
generation effect into consideration. At that point, the discriminatory
pattern returns to the top of the Continuum with a facially-neutral policy
functioning as discriminatory when applied to female candidates.
IV. CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE COURT SYSTEM—THIRD
GENERATION DISCRIMINATION
Second generation discrimination theory has yielded mixed success
in Title VII litigation. The cases examined here, with the exception of
Price Waterhouse, are examples of the theory’s failure to garner recovery
for the plaintiff. It is reasonable to assume that at least some portion of the
claims’ failures were due to factors unique to each case; however, both
Pao and Dukes involved attempts to explain the complex continuum of
implicit bias to juries and judges. This section analyzes the role of gender
bias in the court system and theorizes that gender discrimination cases
based on implicit bias may not be successful if presented to a fact-finder
or reviewing court that employs its own implicit bias to the challenged
employer actions, resulting in a Third Generation of gender
discrimination.

186.
187.
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Implicit Bias and the Jury

The Supreme Court has endeavored to curb the conscious biases that
effect jury selection. 188 Challenges to conscious bias in jury selection
begin with the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides the
right for criminal defendants to have an impartial jury. 189 Jury selection,
the process of seating the impartial jury, is effectuated through voir dire
examination, leading to a series of challenges, either “cause challenges”
or “peremptory challenges.” 190 Cause challenges in jury selection are
monitored by the presiding judge, and thus carry less risk of shielding
racial and gender bias because the reason for the cause challenge must be
openly argued. 191 However, peremptory challenges often involve a
lawyer’s “gut feeling,” allowing the lawyer to eliminate jurors based on
an assessment of which jurors benefit the client’s position, without
argument or explanation. 192 Peremptory challenges went unrestricted for
nearly 200 years. 193 In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court declared
that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely
on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 194 Five years later, the Court held that Batson applied in civil
cases and permitted parties to make Batson-type arguments to preclude
racially based preemptory challenges in civil trials. 195 In 1994, in J.E.B.
v. Alabama, the Court extended the holding in Batson to include
intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, stating that the use of
peremptory challenges to eliminate a particular gender from the jury also
violates the Equal Protection Clause, and is thus prohibited in criminal
and civil trials. 196
Batson and J.E.B. permit challenges to jury selection based on the
use of voir dire to achieve race or gender homogeneity. 197 However,
188. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (disallowing the use of peremptory challenges
to control the gender balance on a jury); see generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(disallowing the use of peremptory challenges to control the racial make-up of a criminal jury).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190. FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (allowing for juror voir dire and cause and peremptory challenges).
191. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Connors v. United States, 158 U.S.
408 (1895)).
192. Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Bias in Jury Selection: Justifying Prohibited
Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 467, 468 (2007).
193. Id. at 469.
194. 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
195. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
196. 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
197. See Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (1992) (providing an overview of the historical antecedents to modern jury
selection cases).
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courts and litigants have struggled to effectively implement strategies that
determine the role of jurors’ implicit biases in decision-making. 198 As
noted in Part II above, implicit biases often operate without
acknowledgement by the holder. 199 A person may not be aware of her own
biases or the role stereotyping has played and does play in her decisionmaking. 200 If the holder is unaware of the bias, the voir dire process is
unlikely to reveal biases that can affect the outcome of a trial, as a juror
can honestly answer a voir dire question without revealing an outcomedeterminative bias. 201 Research has been done on the role gender plays in
courtroom dynamics, finding that juries react differently to female
attorneys and female litigants.202 The research supports the view that
implicit bias effects the juror’s assessment of the case depending on what
is at issue, who is arguing the case, and who is seeking relief. 203 How can
claims for second generation discrimination prevail if implicit bias against
women is at play in the courtroom, especially in a workplace
discrimination case, like Ellen Pao’s, where a female plaintiff who was
represented by a female attorney 204 was seeking relief from a maledominated employer through a jury equally divided between men and
women?

198. Id. at 56.
199. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
201. Forman, supra note 197, at 72 (“[B]ecause of their desire to please the person in the most
authoritative position, jurors questioned by judges during voir dire may not respond honestly. Rather,
cued by the form of the questions or the judge’s demeanor, the jurors may provide the answer they
believe the judge wants to hear.”).
202. Shari V.N. Hodgson & Burt Pryor, Sex Discrimination in the Courtroom: Attorney’s
Gender and Credibility, 71 WOMEN LAW. J. 7 (1985). Research completed by Hodgson and Pryor
studied the relationship between attorney’s gender and perceived credibility and showed that it was
the women participants who rated female attorneys significantly lower on six of the twelve credibility
scales. In the Hodgson and Pryor study, research participants read a summary of a mock court case
involving charges of breaking and entering. The participants then listened to an audiotape of a closing
argument. The closing arguments were the exact same textually but half of the participants heard a
female attorney give the argument and the other half heard a male attorney give the argument. The
results of the study showed that women rated the female attorney significantly less intelligent, less
friendly, less pleasant, less capable, less expert, and less experienced than the male attorney, while
male participants did not show any preference in attorney gender. Even though male participants did
not show a significant preference in attorney gender, the client represented by the female attorney
received more guilty verdicts. Also, when the participants were asked if they would hire the attorney
they heard, it was the male attorney who participants stated was more likely to be hired. This study
suggests that women attorneys face the hardest battles with other females, both clients and jurors. Id.
203. See id. at 7; see generally Monica Biernat & Kathleen Fuegen, Shifting Standards and the
Evaluation of Competence: Complexity in Gender-Based Judgment and Decision Making, 57 J. OF
SOC. ISSUES 707 (2001).
204. Brekke, supra note 66.
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The Pao jury was composed of equal numbers of male and female
jurors. 205 However, it is naïve and somewhat offensive to assume that
female jurors are less biased against female litigants and attorneys. In fact,
research supports the opposite conclusion. When the relationship between
the attorney’s gender and perceived credibility was studied, female
participants rated female attorneys significantly lower on six of twelve
credibility scales. 206 Women “rated the female attorney significantly less
intelligent, less friendly, less pleasant, less capable, less expert, less
experienced, and less trained” than the male attorney. 207 Another study
showed that women hold other women to higher standards than men when
evaluating competence. 208 In considering why jurors show preferences for
male attorneys, another study indicated that certain personal
characteristics and traits are typically associated with the perception of
attorney competence, and those traits are typically deemed masculine, not
feminine, traits. 209 Aggressive attorneys were typically more successful
than passive attorneys, and aggression as a trait is associated positively in
men and negatively in women. 210 In contrast, emotion is a trait associated
positively in women and negatively in men. 211 In the courtroom, a female
attorney who is aggressive elicits negative responses, whereas an
aggressive male attorney is viewed as effective, zealous, and skilled.212

205. Id.
206. See Hodgson & Pryor, supra note 202, at 7.
207. Id.
208. See Biernat & Fuegen, supra note 203, at 711-14. These two studies evaluated predictions
in hiring decisions. The first study included 175 introductory psychological students as participants.
Participants were asked to play the role of a hiring professional. Each participant was given a folder
that included a job description, resume, and evaluation form. The job description remained the same
where the job title was either executive secretary or an executive chief of staff position. All
participants reviewed the same resume with half of the resumes having the name Kenneth and the
other half having the name Katherine. The participants would decide if they would hire the applicant
they were reviewing. The data suggested only female participants showed evidence of predicted
patterns and were harsher on female applicants. In study two, 64 participants were presented with 16
applications to consider for a position of mechanical engineer. The applications created seven pairs
and one resume was a female’s name and the other a male’s name. They were to view 14 applicants
from the pool and select three to move on to the short list and then from those applicants, one would
be hired. This study showed that women would be more likely to make the short list but less likely to
be hired.; see also Hodgson & Pryor, supra note 202, at 7 (explaining that female attorneys may face
the hardest battles when working with other women).
209. Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney
Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 538 (1996).
210. Id. at 548 (explaining that “successful” in this study is defined as being the more influential
and effective attorney).
211. Id. at 549-50.
212. Id. at 549.
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The double-bind for female attorneys in the courtroom comes into
play when a female attorney exhibits a feminine trait, such as emotion. 213
The female attorney who is viewed as emotional may lose credibility with
the jury because she is seen as unreliable, rather than passionate. 214 A
study of personal injury cases showed that male-dominated juries awarded
higher damage amounts to male plaintiffs and lower damage amounts to
female plaintiffs. 215 Female-dominated juries awarded female plaintiffs
above average damages in only 3% of cases studied. 216 Other studies have
found that female plaintiffs seeking damages in wrongful death cases with
the loss of a male spouse are more likely to prevail and receive a higher
damages award, whereas male plaintiffs seeking damages for wrongful
death of a female spouse prevail less and receive smaller damages
awards. 217
The research referenced here demonstrates the overwhelming
complexity of gender bias in the courtroom. The research shows that
gender bias, predominantly implicit gender bias, effects the jury’s
assessment of the facts and parties in the case. 218 A juror may assume the
female plaintiff provides less financially, and should thus receive a
smaller award in a personal injury case and a larger award in a wrongful
death case where she is the surviving spouse. 219 Likewise, a juror may
generally disfavor a female litigant or attorney if the litigant or attorney is
213. Id.; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 129 (defining the “double-bind”
dynamic).
214. Hahn & Clayton, supra note 209, at 550.
215. Stuart Nagel & Lenore Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 56 JUDICATURE 108, 109
(1972) (explaining that male-dominated juries awarded amounts 12% above the average award to
male plaintiffs and 17% below the average award to female plaintiffs in cases with the same or
substantially similar injury claims).
216. Id. at 110. Nagel and Weitzman analyzed data collected by the Jury Verdict Research
Company in 364 personal injury cases. They examined the gender composition of the juries who
served on these cases and the magnitude of the damage awards for the prevailing plaintiffs. The study
notes that in most cases the male plaintiffs suffered more severe injuries and this discrepancy could
factor into the study’s conclusions. Id.
217. Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage
Awards, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 263, 264 (1991). The article reports on studies conducted by the
Washington State Supreme Court and the King County Superior Court in Seattle, Washington. Data
to conduct these studies was gathered from the Superior Court Management System and Jury Verdicts
Research, Inc. It should be noted that while the data covered a five-year period, neither source had a
complete record of all the wrongful death cases tried within that time. Id.
218. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1144 (“Our default assumption is juror unexceptionalism—
given that implicit biases generally influence decisionmaking, there is no reason to presume that
citizens become immune to the effects of these biases when they serve in the role of jurors. Leading
scholars from the juror bias field have expressly raised the possibility that the psychological
mechanisms might be ‘unintentional and even non-conscious processes.’”) (internal citations
omitted).
219. Id.
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aggressively seeking relief. 220 It may be impossible for plaintiffs like
Betty Dukes or Ellen Pao to prevail when the case itself examines gender
bias and places the issues of implicit bias and discrimination before the
jury.
B.

Implicit Bias and the Judiciary

The previous section raised the question of how implicit bias can
operate with regard to the jurors’ evaluations of the case, the lawyers, and
the parties. Our system of civil justice puts trial judges in the role of
presiding over the civil trial and appellate judges over the appeal, thus any
discussion of gender discrimination litigation must consider the role of
implicit bias in the judiciary. 221
The trial judge presides over the jury selection process, often asking
her own voir dire questions. 222 Based on Batson and J.E.B., the party
challenging the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on
race or gender makes the initial objection. 223 The burden then shifts to the
other party to provide a neutral explanation for exercising peremptory
challenges to include jurors of one gender. 224 The judge then evaluates the
sufficiency of the proffered neutral explanation. 225 In racial discrimination
cases following Batson, neutral explanations have included various
factors, such as English language proficiency, as well as similarities in
age, background, or neighborhood. 226 In gender cases, women have been
excluded from juries based on neutral explanations, such as marital status,
number of children, smiling during questioning, and eye contact. 227 The
trial judge alone determines if the proffered reason for the peremptory
strike is pre-textual, thus her own implicit biases can give effect to genderbased exclusion if she finds the explanations gender neutral. In sum, the

220. Hahn & Clayton, supra note 209, at 550.
221. The author intentionally switches between indicating the judges as male and female
throughout the text to show that both male judges and females judges employ implicit biases against
female litigants and advocates.
222. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Connors v. United States,
158 U.S. 408 (1895)).
223. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1994).
224. Id.; see also Forman, supra note 197, at 58-59.
225. Forman, supra note 197, at 59.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 61-63 (citing People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1988), rev’d,
168 A.D.2d 715, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1990) (discussing a state court case challenging the Bronx
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude women from a criminal trial jury). During voir
dire of 34 potential jurors, the prosecutor challenged nine women and one man, offering pre-textual
reasons for each peremptory challenge against a female juror. Id.
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judge’s own implicit bias may lead her to accept the pre-textual
explanations. 228
The trial judge also functions as the gatekeeper in presiding over
motions to dismiss at the pleading stage and later in the discovery
process. 229 If a judge has an implicit bias against women, which can affect
his assessment of the female plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim, is he
more likely to rule in favor of the party seeking dismissal? There are no
studies that have tested whether biases, explicit or implicit, influence how
actual trial judges decide motions to dismiss in actual cases. 230 However,
there is no reason to think judges are immune from implicit bias. 231 When
considering the role of the trial judge in determining pre-trial motions, we
must consider the entire nature of making judgments. 232 Generally, judges
turn to judicial experience and common sense when making
determinations as to whether a party has a legally cognizable claim. 233
Common sense generally refers to the social context for making the
relevant judgment—how do we understand the social context of the issues
to be determined? 234 Studies have shown that people rely more on general
categorical information, also known as schema, to make judgments when
they lack specific information. 235 That reliance on categorical information
228. Forman, supra note 197, at 63 (“Each of these explanations reflects stereotyped
assumptions about a woman’s role, abilities, and character. Is striking a woman because she is a
mother ‘neutral’ or pre-textual? One might conclude that it was pre-textual, at least if the prosecutor
did not strike fathers. Should a prosecutor be allowed to excuse ‘homemakers’ or any other
occupational category that is predominantly female? And, of course, explanations based on demeanor
or appearance, commonly accepted to rebut Batson claims based on race, could just as easily mask
gender discrimination. In one case reported anecdotally, an attorney apparently struck a male juror
‘solely in order to have another woman to look at in the jury box.’”).
229. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (cases holding that to survive a
motion to dismiss at the pleading stage, the complaint must meet a plausibility standard).
230. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1162.
231. Id. at 1146.
232. Id. at 1160-61.
233. Id. at 1160 (“How are courts supposed to decide what is ‘Twom-bal’ plausible when the
motion to dismiss happens before discovery, especially in civil rights cases in which the defendant
holds the key information? According to the Court, ‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.’”) (internal citations omitted).
234. Id. (citing Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., Social Judgeability: The Impact of MetaInformational Cues on the Use of Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48 (1994), which
developed the theory of “social judgeability”).
235. Kang et al., supra note 12 at 1160 (“And when judges turn to their judicial experience and
common sense, what will this store of knowledge tell them about whether some particular comment
or act happened and whether such behavior evidences legally cognizable discrimination? Decades of
social psychological research demonstrate that our impressions are driven by the interplay between
categorical (general to the category) and individuating (specific to the member of the category)
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can be further complicated when the judge either thinks he has more
relevant information than is actually available, as at the pre-trial stage, or
the information available is being assessed through his own implicit
biases. 236
For example, in a Title VII case, the judge may be asked to rule on a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), determining whether the plaintiff’s
claim is “plausible.” 237 A ruling at this stage assesses the pleadings only,
thus the judge lacks detailed factual information that would be available
after discovery. 238 Given the lack of individuated information about the
facts of the claim, the judge may rely more heavily on categorical
assumptions, for example, assumptions about certain workplace
environments or the general viability of workplace discrimination
cases. 239 The judge may rely on her knowledge of past cases, such as Ellen
Pao’s case, which did not render a verdict for the plaintiff. She may rely
on her own experiences in the workplace in the absence of fully developed
facts about the case at bar. She may further consider herself better
informed based on her own experiences and knowledge, which could lead
her to rely too much on categorical information about gender
discrimination cases. 240 This over-reliance on categorical information is
an impediment to quality judgments as it allows the judge’s implicit biases
formed by her experiences to influence her assessment of the motion and
the case.
Appellate judges are not immune from similar questions about
implicit bias. It would be again unreasonable to assume that judges, even
at the highest level, are immune from the biases we all experience.241 In
Dukes, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, included statements that
can be read to reveal his own inexperience with workplace discrimination
and implicit bias. 242 In evaluating the unlikelihood that Wal-Mart

information. For example, in order to come to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile
general schemas for Latina workers with individualized data about the specific plaintiff. When we
lack sufficient individuating information—which is largely the state of affairs at the motion to dismiss
stage—we have no choice but to rely more heavily on our schemas.”).
236. Id.; see Yzerbyt et al., supra note 234, at 49. In discussing a study on social judgeability,
the authors note that because participants in the study had received no individuating information about
the study subjects, the study participants tended to judge the subjects in accordance with their
schemas, or categorical information, about the subjects, basing their judgments on general, categorical
information about comedians and archivists. Id.
237. See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
238. Id.
239. Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1160.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1146.
242. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011).
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managers would exercise discretion in a manner that disadvantaged
female employees, Scalia stated:
To the contrary, left to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. 243

The majority further dismissed the plaintiffs’ evidence of discrimination,
which consisted of statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, and an
expert’s social framework analysis. The expert concluded that Wal-Mart’s
culture and personnel policies made it vulnerable to gender
discrimination. 244 The all-male majority’s rejection of the social
framework analysis as evidence of gender discrimination at Wal-Mart was
perhaps most demonstrative of the majority’s lack of understanding of the
claim. 245 The opinion rejects wholesale the idea that certain social
frameworks—those where male-dominated management is able to selfreplicate through discretionary pay and promotion policies—can
substantiate a Title VII claim. 246 Perhaps most telling on the question of
whether implicit bias affected the judicial evaluation in Dukes is Justice
Ginsberg’s dissent, which addressed the intrepid blindness of the
majority. 247 On the question of whether discretion could be used to
discriminate, she stated:
The practice of delegating to supervisors’ large discretion to make personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been
known to have the potential to produce disparate effects. Managers, like
all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware. The
risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates
gender stereotypes. 248

There are other indicators that appellate judges, at the Supreme Court
and elsewhere, are not immune to implicit biases in their judgments and
243. Id.
244. Id. at 356.
245. See generally id. Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito formed the majority
in Parts I, II, and III. Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan concurred in Parts I and III
and dissented in Part II, which addressed the certification of the putative class under FRCP Rule 23(a).
Id.
246. Id. at 354-55 (rejecting Dr. William Beilby’s social framework analysis entirely, stating
that Bielby’s evidence is “worlds away” from significant proof that Wal-Mart operated under a
general policy of discrimination); see also Reinsch & Goltz, supra note 153, at 272-73.
247. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 372-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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their conduct. 249 A recent study found that male justices at the Supreme
Court interrupt female justices far more frequently than the other way
around. 250 The female justices use fewer words than the male justices, and
yet are still interrupted with greater frequency. 251 Changing habitual
modes of thinking and acting on gender requires a concerted effort by the
judiciary. 252 State and federal courts have engaged in serious and thorough
inquiry into the role of gender bias in the court system; however, the
impact of that introspective work remains unclear. 253 And suggestions that
biased attitudes in the judiciary will “age out” when older judges are
replaced by younger lawyers are not supported by the evidence. 254 The
result is that litigants in Title VII cases predicated on theories of implicit
bias, and specifically second generation discrimination, face a separate
hurdle when seeking relief in the court system. The litigant is again placed
on a continuum of bias that flows from a male-dominated culture and
operates largely unchecked. The court system thus subjects the litigant to
a Third Generation of gender discrimination.

249. See generally Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final
Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1994) (reporting on an
extensive study undertaken by the Ninth Circuit to explore gender bias at the trial and appellate court
levels); see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Women Shaping the Legal Process: Judicial Gender Bias as
Grounds for Reversal, 84 KY. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1996) (examining the ruling in Catchpole v. Brannon,
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Cal. Sept. 14, 1995), which reversed a trial court
ruling based on the court’s demonstrated gender bias); see generally Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges
Can Learn from Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15 (1997).
250. See Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology
and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2017); see also
Adam Liptak, Let Me Finish Please: Conservative Men Dominate the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2017), at A13.
251. Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 249, at 74.
252. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Foreword, 84 GEO. L.J. 1651 (May 1996). In her Foreword
to the Journal’s special section on The Report of the Special Committee on Gender prepared for the
D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, Justice Ginsberg wrote “self-inspection
heightens appreciation that progress does not occur automatically, but requires a concerted effort to
change habitual modes of thinking and acting.” In a short but impactful writing, the Justice encourages
the federal judiciary to “exert strong leadership to eliminate unfairness and its perception in federal
courts.” The Foreword also relates an incident of “good-natured amusement” when Justice Ginsberg
was criticized for an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. In response to the confusion,
the National Association of Women Judges presented Justices Ginsberg and O’Connor with T-shirts
which said “I’m Sandra, not Ruth” and “I’m Ruth, not Sandra.” Justice Ginsberg relates this incident
to illustrate one of the study’s findings, that women attorneys are often mistaken for non-attorneys
more than their male counterparts. Id.
253. See Coughenour, supra note 249, at 809-35.
254. See id. at 810-11.
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Third Generation Discrimination

This Article has attempted to draw together various sources to
support a working theory that gender-based discrimination has deep roots
in stereotype and social bias, preventing any one theory of recovery to
prevail. Although overt gender discrimination has been largely reformed,
the bias-based species of gender discrimination understood as second
generation discrimination has endured despite strong legal challenges. 255
As discussed in Part II, one theory for why second generation cases have
not been more successful is the complexity of the claims themselves. 256
In stating a second generation claim, the bias-based nature of the claim
must be understood by the trial judge, the jury, and the appellate courts.
And the understanding must be more than intellectual, as the very nature
of the discrimination claim rests in human behavior that operates at an
unconscious level.
The Second Generation Discrimination Continuum (see Figure 1.1)
depicts a cycle of bias-based behaviors that self-perpetuates and creates
environments that offer fewer opportunities for change. 257 A similar cycle
has evolved in the court system’s review of discrimination cases. Overall,
juries are no longer exclusively male, and jury pools often mimic the
gender balance of the relevant community. 258 However, studies have
shown that female jurors employ implicit bias when evaluating female
attorneys and litigants, thus gender diversity in the jury pool offers no
assurance that a second generation discrimination claim will be better
understood. 259 The federal judiciary is predominantly male, meaning that
those presiding over motions to dismiss, voir dire, and appellate review in
Title VII cases, are less likely to possess the experiences and information
that is necessary to facilitate a full understanding of second generation
discrimination. 260 The dynamics of judging and the demographics of the
255. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also Pao Trial
Brief, supra note 36.
256. See generally Sturm, supra note 11; see also Continuum, Figure 1.1, supra at p. 82.
257. See Continuum, Figure 1.1, supra at p. 82.
258. See Karen L. Cipriani, The Numbers Don’t Add Up: Challenging the Premise of J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel T.B., 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1253, 1266 (1994) (explaining that the author surveyed
the D.C. Circuit jury pool from January to June 1993, a sample of 4,302 persons, and found that in
the 105 juries selected in civil and criminal trials during the six-month period, 55.8% of jurors were
female and 43.1% were male) (noting that national level data on the gender composition of civil
and/or criminal trial juries was not available).
259. Hodgson & Pryor, supra note 202, at 7.
260. See Women in the Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, Fact Sheet, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr.,
(Oct. 2016) (noting that there have only been four women judges on the U.S. Supreme Court with
three currently sitting on the Court; 60 of 167 (35%) of circuit court judges are women; and 33% of
United States District Court judges are women).
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judiciary create another obstacle to effective relief—Third Generation
Discrimination.
The Third Generation Discrimination Continuum (Figure 1.2)

Phase III: The
procedural rule's
interpretation
protects the
dominant group in
future Title VII
litigation.

Phase I:The
Title VII
litigation
requires judical
action under a
procedural rule.

Phase II:The
procedural rule is
interpreted to favor
the Title VII
defendant.

Like the theory of second generation discrimination, Third
Generation Discrimination also operates on a continuum that can proceed
without interruption if certain factors are present. Consider a hypothetical
case with facts similar to Dukes, where the gist of the female plaintiff’s
claim is that she was discriminated against by her employer through the
use of discretionary pay and promotion policies administered by male
managers. 261 The theory of the case is predicated on second generation
discrimination under Title VII. Assume the defendant files a motion to
dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint per Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the plaintiff
has failed to state a claim that is plausible on its face, triggering Phase I
in Figure 1.2. Rule 12(b)(6) is a facially-neutral rule of civil procedure
designed to dismiss implausible claims, eliminating the time and expense
of further pleading or discovery. 262 Assume the trial judge is male and
261. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
262. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-80 (2009); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that the plausibility standard has been
criticized for requiring an assessment of the case itself at the pleading stage, thus requiring the judge
to evaluate a motion to dismiss before hearing individuated information about the facts or
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lacks personal experience with gender-based discrimination either
through his experience as an attorney or his experience as a judge. In the
absence of individuated information about this case or these parties, the
judge may default to categorical information when judging the
defendant’s claim for relief and dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as not
plausible, employing reasoning similar to the majority’s reasoning in
Dukes. 263 If so, the facially-neutral rule, Rule 12(b)(6), has been
interpreted to favor the employer-defendant, illustrating Phase II of the
Continuum (see Figure 1.2).
Next, assume the plaintiff appeals the trial judge’s ruling dismissing
her case. The plaintiff-appellant is now asking a predominantly male
appellate judiciary to assess the lower court’s action, which requires the
appellate court to assess de novo the plausibility of her claim. 264 If the
appellate court affirms the lower court, this interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6)
can perpetuate a general misunderstanding of a second generation
discrimination claim and weaken the availability of the theory for other
litigants (see Phase III of Figure 1.2). The cycle will then repeat, as the
first case becomes precedent for the next, diminishing Title VII litigation
and validating the suspect employment practice.
This Continuum adds insult to injury as it provides even more
barriers to successful gender bias litigation. The Third Generation
Discrimination Continuum needs an interrupter—a force that can cause
the system to examine itself and rely less on personal experience, or the
lack thereof, when assessing a second generation discrimination claim. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest the necessary interrupter. In
fact, the next steps in developing a working Third Generation
Discrimination theory requires empirical research exploring the
procedural histories of Title VII cases predicated on implicit gender bias.
To evaluate the role of the jury and judge on implicit bias-based Title VII
litigation, a sample of cases should be studied, evaluating the ultimate
disposition of the sample cases and the means of disposition. How many
second generation cases are dismissed at the pleading stage? At the
summary judgment stage? How many second generation cases reach a
jury, and what is the result of jury deliberations? What is the appellate
landscape for second generation claims? How many cases are appealed
and what is the level of success on appeal for a plaintiff-appellant? With
circumstances of the case).
263. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
264. Women in the Judiciary, supra note 259; see also Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 568-70 (holding
that the appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6)).
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this information, we can explore the system’s impact on these complex
claims.
V. CONCLUSION
As Justice Ginsberg noted, “self-inspection heightens
appreciation.” 265 Self-inspection requires that lawyers and judges assess
their own biases, remaining open to the possibility that we, as members
of the legal profession, operate on our own biases in a manner which
inhibits reform. The lack of specific information about experiences, which
differ from our own, prompts us to revert to stereotypes and general,
categorical information about people and places. If a male judge has never
worked in a setting where advancement predicated on relocation would
interfere with his career, he may not fully understand the chilling effect
that requirement has on a female employee, otherwise qualified for
promotion, who is not in a position to relocate her family away from
family support or other resources. But, if he knows he lacks this
perspective, he can seek it, requesting arguments and evidence that allow
him to better evaluate the specific facts of the plaintiff’s claim. True “selfinspection” is the ultimate interrupter of any bad cycle.

265.

See Ginsberg, supra note 251, at 1652.
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